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ABSTRACT 
 
The amendments to the existing standard IAS 19 published in 2011 changed the 
requirements concerning the reporting of defined benefit plans for public entities 
applying IFRS, effective as of January 2013 with full retrospective application. 
The revised standard from 2011 prevent earnings management through the 
deferring and concealment of some actuarial gains and losses, but still leave 
scope for professional assumptions concerning the determination of the discount 
rate. The purpose of this thesis is to study the extent to which earnings 
management occurs when accounting for defined benefit plans, before and after 
the amendment of IAS 19. A multiple regression analysis has been carried out in 
two different parts, where two different samples are used. We have limited our 
scope to Nordic entities in part one, and entities from all over the world listed on 
markets regulated by ESMA in part two. The uniform criterion for the included 
entities in both parts is the reporting in accordance with IFRS for defined benefit 
plans. Part one process the corridor approach in order to discuss circumstances 
before the amendment of IAS 19, and part two process the discount rate in order 
to discuss circumstances both before and after the amendment as well as its 
effects on one of few factors still possible to manipulate. We have selected three 
independent variables that represent a selection of entities’ incentives to 
manipulate earnings, namely leverage, deficits in pension plans and 
profitability. Our major findings indicate that earnings management did occur to 
a certain extent under the previous standard, and that the amendment seems to 
have decreased the use of earnings management when accounting for defined 
benefit plans.  Our suggestions on further research on the subject is an analysis 
of the standard with regard to earnings management, carried out with additional 
or entirely different earnings management incentives such as ownership 
structure, management’s bonus scheme and degree of corporate governance. 
 
Keywords: IAS 19, defined benefit plans, earnings management, the corridor 
approach, discount rate 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Pension accounting is an area where managers are required to exercise judgment 
and rely on estimates, and is known to be very complicated as the needed 
assumptions are based on future circumstances that are of an unsure nature. 
Each entity has a pension liability to its employees that is to be paid in the 
future, which requires that said entity reserve resources in order to be able to 
cover the liability when it is settled. This can be carried out through either 
defined benefit plans where plan assets are used and thus generate interest, or 
through defined contribution plans where fixed amounts of money are set aside 
at the end of each period. In this thesis we will exclude defined contribution 
plans, and focus entirely on defined benefit plans.   
  
The amendments to the existing standard IAS 19 published in 2011 changed the 
requirements concerning the reporting of defined benefit plans for published 
entities applying IFRS, effective as of January 2013 with full retrospective 
application. The previous regulation enabled entities to defer actuarial gains and 
losses to forthcoming periods - a method referred to as the corridor approach. 
Actuarial gains and losses arise from changes in actuarial assumptions, required 
when determining the size of the pension liability, the expected return on plan 
assets and discount rate. The assumptions have to be made for certain 
demographic- and financial factors such as life expectancy, average salary 
increase and staff turnover. In addition to this is the fact that the estimated- and 
actual returns on plan assets were reported differently: the expected net 
earnings from plan assets affected the result, whilst the actual gains and losses 
were reported under other comprehensive income (a thorough declaration of the 
components when accounting for defined benefit plans will follow in chapter 
two). This created a possibility to distort the result, known as earnings 
management. 
  
The purpose of this thesis is to study the extent to which earnings management 
occurs when accounting for defined benefit plans, before and after the 
amendment of IAS 19.  
 
The revised standard from 2011 prevent earnings management through the 
deferring and concealment of some actuarial gains and losses, but still leave 
scope for professional assumptions concerning the determination of the discount 
rate. As the amendment is effective as of January 2013, the subject is highly 
relevant and timely. Previous research on the subject have focused on the extent 
of earnings management in pensions accounting under IAS 19 (1998), as this 
enabled possibilities to manipulate results through the accruing of actuarial 
gains and losses through the applying of the corridor method, explained 
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thoroughly in chapter 2.1. Most of the research conducted earlier has processed 
the adoption of SFAS 87 in USA for entities following the US GAAP, which is 
similar to IAS 19 (2011) in many ways. This study will complement this research 
with new data collected after the amendment of IAS 19, with focus on two 
different aspects on earnings management in accounting for defined benefit 
plans. The first part process the change in restatements for entities that used 
the corridor approach as previously deferrable gains and losses now have to be 
recognized in the primary financial reports, and the second part process the 
discount rate where there’s still scope for assumptions and thus earnings 
management.  
 
Our main research questions are: to what extent did earnings management occur 
during the previous version of the standard, and to what extent does it still 
occur? In order to answer these questions, a multiple regression analysis will be 
carried out where two different samples are used. Part one is based on a sample 
containing solely Nordic entities, whereas part two is based on a sample 
containing entities from all over the world, with securities listed on markets 
regulated by ESMA (the European Securities and Markets Authority). The 
uniform criterion for the included entities in both parts is the reporting in 
accordance to IFRS with defined benefit plans. Our study will focus on the 
variables we hypothesize are used in order to manipulate earnings within the 
accounting for defined benefit plans, being actuarial gains and losses (part one), 
and different combinations of the discount rate and the expected rate of return 
(part two). The selection of independent variables included in the analysis 
represent entities’ incentives to manage earnings, limited down to deficits in 
pension plans, leverage and profitability. We hypothesize that entities managed 
earnings under the previous version of the standard, and that this still occur 
through the manipulation of the discount rate under the amended version. Our 
findings support the former prediction as the amount of restatements was 
significantly correlated with several earnings management incentives as well as 
the latter, but with indications not as extensive. 
  
The rest of this paper follows as: chapter two contains a presentation of the 
institutional setting where the amendment of IAS 19 and actuarial assumptions 
are discussed, chapter three contains a presentation of factors and previous 
research building up to our hypotheses, chapter four provides a presentation of 
the research design, chapter five contains a presentation of the research results, 
and in chapter six a concluding discussion of the results is presented. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
 
IAS 19 regulates both defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans, but 
as this paper only discusses the former, our focus will be solely on that. In order 
to overcome the complexity of the accounting for defined benefit plans, a 
clarification of its components will follow. 
 
 COMPONENTS OF DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
 
Component Definition 
 
PBO, Projected 
benefit obligation 
The projected liability that is to be paid out in the future, 
based on demographic and financial assumptions such as life 
expectancy, average increase of salaries and employee 
turnover. 
Net defined 
benefit liability 
A deficit in the pensions plan, arising when the projected 
benefit obligation exceed the fair value of the plan assets. 
Net defined 
benefit asset  
A surplus in the pensions plan, arising when the fair value of 
the plan assets exceed the projected benefit obligation. 
Discount factor The rate at which the PBO is discounted. The discount factor 
is determined by reference to a High Quality Corporate Bond 
(HQC bonds), mainly bonds that are rated as “AAA” or “AA” 
by a recognized rating agency, and the estimated time until 
the deficit is to be paid. The latter generally makes entities’ 
discount rate differ from each other as it is based solely on 
assumptions. Differences in countries’ HQC bonds are also 
common. The higher discount factor the smaller recognized 
liability, and thus higher risk. 
Actuarial gains 
and losses 
Remeasurements of the return on plan assets and/or changes 
in actuarial assumptions, such as financial assumptions (e.g. 
market expectations, expected salaries and salary increases), 
mortality assumptions and staff turnover expectations. 
Changes in those create actuarial gains and losses and are 
reported in other comprehensive income, consequently not 
affecting the comprehensive income (profit or loss). 
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Expected return 
on plan assets 
One of the components in IAS 19 (2008), recognized in profit 
or loss for the actual period and indirectly reflecting the risk 
of the pensions plan. 
Service costs The contributions to the projected liability arising from 
employees’ hours of labor during the current period. 
Net interest 
 
 
 
 
 
Pensions plan 
gains and losses 
from settlements 
The discount rate multiplied with the current value of the net 
defined benefit liability (asset), creating an interest expense 
(income). In other words: an interest cost arises from a deficit 
in the pensions plan, and an interest income from a surplus 
in the pensions plan. 
 
Gains or losses from the termination of a pension liability 
(when the pension is paid out to an employee). Gains arise 
when the amount paid fall below the projected liability, and 
losses when the amount paid exceed the projected liability. 
 
The complexity lies in the assumptions, as they are to estimate circumstances 
several decades in advance. An in-depth explanation of assumptions of this kind, 
referred to as actuarial assumptions, will follow in chapter 2.2. 
 
2.1 THE AMENDMENT OF IAS 19 
As of January 2013, IAS 19 (2011) is mandatory for all entities applying IFRS 
with full retrospective application. The previous options for reporting actuarial 
gains and losses were narrowed down to one directive, with one single way of 
presenting them in the financial reports. The amendment was carried out in 
order to accomplish a more uniform accounting regulation with the US GAAP, 
and because of the need of increased transparency of the financial reports. The 
IASB find this approach simpler and representative of the underlying values. 
After the amendment the reporting of pension obligations will be more 
understandable and comparable. (IFRS 2011) 
 
Before the amendment, IAS 19 (1998)                                 
Actuarial gains and losses did not have to be recognized immediately. As a result 
of this, an asset or liability in the statement of financial position didn’t 
necessarily have to reflect its true value. Different options for presenting 
actuarial gains and losses made comparisons among different entities hard, and 
the ability to conceal these gains and losses made the reporting confusing and 
deceptive. The difference in the reporting of expected return on plan assets and 
actual return on plan assets was misleading as the former was to be reported in 
profit or loss and the difference between the two in other comprehensive income, 
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here on after referred to as OCI. As the OCI do not affect the reported earnings 
in profit or loss, entities could report an over-optimistic expected return on plan 
assets and thus increasing the comprehensive income without having do adjust 
the profit or loss downwards if the actual return on plan assets turned out to be 
less than expected. 
 
The accounting options for the components in the previous version of the 
standard were as follows: 
Service costs – recognized in profit or loss the actual period 
Interest cost – recognized in profit or loss the actual period 
Expected return on plan assets – recognized in profit or loss the actual period 
Actuarial gains and losses – a) Recognized in profit or loss the actual period 
b) Recognized in OCI the actual period 
c) Deferred through the corridor approach 
(IFRS 2011) 
 
The corridor approach enabled entities to defer actuarial gains and losses to 
future periods, as they were first recognized when the cumulative unrecognized 
amount exceeded 10 % of the greater of the present value of the projected 
pension liability and the fair value of the plan assets at the beginning of the 
period. The part exceeding the corridor was then amortized linearly in the 
expected remaining working lives of the entities’ employees participating in the 
pensions plan. (KPMG 2011) Through the corridor approach, entities could 
recognize an asset even though there was a deficit in the defined benefit plan. 
Gains and losses could also be recognized even though they derived from past 
periods, which created a direct possibility to smooth results. As a result of this, 
entities could report different revenues and costs deriving from their defined 
benefit plans, even though their defined benefit obligations were identical. (IFRS 
2011) 
 
After the amendment, IAS 19 (2011) 
The corridor approach is removed – entities can no longer defer actuarial gains 
and losses. The components when accounting for defined benefit plans were 
reworked and divided into service cost, net interest and remeasurements. 
After the amendment, a surplus in the defined benefit plan has to be recognized 
as a net defined benefit asset and a deficit as a net defined benefit liability. The 
net interest replaced the earlier interest cost on the defined benefit obligation 
and interest income on expected rate of return on plan assets, and is determined 
by multiplying the discount rate by the net defined benefit liability/asset. By this 
approach the entity will report a financing expense when there is a deficit in the 
pension plan, and a financing income when there’s a surplus.  
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Service- and finance costs have, as described above, to be included in profit or 
loss for the current period. Changes in actuarial assumptions (now referred to as 
remeasurements) have to be reported as they occur in OCI, and will 
consequently never be reclassified to profit or loss. The reporting of 
remeasurements in OCI is a direct response to concerns regarding the 
misleading effects of year-to-year fluctuations of a long-term liability. By 
reporting it in the OCI entities’ annual profit or loss will not be affected directly, 
but information must be given about each component’s share of the OCI in 
disclosures. (IFRS 2011) 
 
The impact of the new amendment will be that most entities’ employee benefit 
expense will increase (PwC 2013), and the OCI and the net assets in the 
statement of financial position will fluctuate more on a year-to-year basis. 
Entities that applied the corridor approach in previous periods, and entities with 
an earlier reported gap between expected return on plan assets and the discount 
rate will be affected to the most extent. (KPMG 2011) 
 
2.2 ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS  
As mentioned earlier, the complexity in the accounting for defined benefit plans 
lies in the actuarial assumptions. This because a large amount of estimations, 
both demographic and financial, must be made in order to determine the size of 
the pension liability and the period by which it shall be discounted. Demographic 
estimations being for example employee turnover, average salary increase and 
life expectancy, and financial estimations being the discount rate. Changes in 
those create actuarial gains and losses (as of January 2013 reported as 
remeasurements), as a result of the pension liability decreasing or increasing. 
According to the standard the assumptions must be neutral in the sense that 
they should be prudent but not excessively so, and mutually compatible in the 
sense that they should be realistic. This is achieved by reflecting the economic 
relationship between factors like inflation and discount rate.  
 
In order to be able to regulate the liability in the future, plan assets are used. 
These assets should ensure that there are sufficient funds in order to pay the 
obligation, determined through the Project Unit Credit Method. The method help 
determining the present value of the defined benefit plans, but as well as for the 
determination of many of its other components, this require several assumptions. 
As the liability is not to be paid out in the near future, the pension obligation 
must be calculated at a discounted value. The discount rate is not only used to 
determine the present value of pension obligation, but also to determine the cost 
of labor and the net interest on plan assets. The assumptions can be made by the 
entity itself, but if needed the entity can employ a qualified actuary to aid with 
the calculations. (Marton, Lumsden, Lundqvist & Pettersson 2013) 
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In order to research both the effects of the amendment of IAS 19 and the extent 
to which entities still use earnings management, we’ve divided our hypotheses 
into two parts - part one being ‘the corridor approach’ and part two being ‘the 
discount rate’. Part one focus on earnings management in relation to the 
conditions before the amendment. As the corridor approach is removed as of 
January 2013, the previously hidden profits or losses will appear as 
restatements in entities’ financial reports for year 2013. A change in the value of 
restatements representing previously deferred actuarial gains and losses over 
the two years (before and after the amendment’s effective date) that’s above 
average can be interpreted as an indication of the previous use of earnings 
management. Part two focus on earnings management both before and after the 
amendment, and in relation to one of few factors within accounting for defined 
benefit plans that still involve actuarial assumptions - the discount rate. If the 
discount factor change significantly as a result of the amendment, this can also 
be an indication of the use of earnings management. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Earnings management is a very wide subject, which have resulted in most of the 
research focusing on its extent concentrated to specific variables. The research is 
very extensive, with findings sometimes contradicting each other. In order to 
keep our focus on pension accounting we have limited our scope to previous 
research carried out on variables directly relevant to our thesis. The following 
research findings process earnings management when determining the expected 
rate of return on plan assets, thus being relevant to our thesis as it is included in 
two of our dependent variables in part two. 
 
In this thesis we use the following definition of earnings management: 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of 
the entity or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting numbers”. 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999) 
 
Bergstresser, Desai and Rauh (2006) found in their study several reasons why 
entities use earnings management in determining the expected return on plan 
assets, with one reason being management opportunism. They argue that 
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entities make more aggressive assumptions when preparing for a firm 
acquisition, when issuing equity and when management has the opportunity to 
exercise stock options. If entities have to report a loss, if they expect a decreased 
result, or if the earnings growth is below the industry average, there is also a 
tendency to use aggressive assumptions. 
  
Hsu, A, Wu, C and Lin examined if financial distress risk and ownership 
structure can affect the assumptions for future salary growth and expected rate 
of return on plan assets. They concluded that entities tend to increase the value 
of their pension assets by increasing the expected rate of return and reduce the 
value of pension liabilities by reducing the expected salary growth. 
 
Asthana (2007) searched to find whether managers use the expected return on 
plan assets to manipulate earnings in order to influence entities’ value. He found 
evidence that they do: entities may use the expected return to affect earnings per 
share when they are under pressure to achieve performance goals. The difficulty 
in the pensions accounting and the extent of assumptions allows management to 
make discretionary assessments. Thus, aggressive assumptions can occur when 
estimating the expected return.  
 
Amir and Gordon (1996) have also studied if management follows the standards 
given, or if they are either too conservative or too aggressive in their 
assumptions. They established that entities with large post-retirement benefits 
obligations and highly indebted entities are more aggressive in their 
assumptions. They discovered that the entity's specific situation, such as the 
leverage ratio, the amount of post-retirement benefit obligations, the occurrence 
of the reporting of deviating results and pensions plan amendments are related 
to the degree of conservatism when making assumptions.  
 
3.1 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT FACTORS 
In this section we present our dependent variables that we hypothesize are being 
used in order to manage earnings. 
 
3.1.1 The corridor approach 
Entities with actuarial losses deferred through the corridor approach have in 
previous periods reported a result higher than that if the actuarial losses were to 
be recognized in profit or loss. As a result of IAS 19 (2011) the actuarial losses for 
entities using the corridor before the amendment have been reclassified and 
addressed in remeasurements, resulting in actuarial gains and losses now 
reported as they occur in OCI. 
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As mentioned in previous chapters, the amended IAS 19 has to be applied with 
full retrospective recognition. In accordance with IAS 8 (Accounting policies, 
Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors), the financial statements shall, if 
retrospective recognition is required, reflect conditions as though prior ways of 
accounting never occurred (except to the extent that it is unfeasible). Differences 
that arise from such changes are referred to as restatements. (IFRS, 2012) As 
the values previously deferred through the corridor approach will be classified as 
restatements and recognized in profit or loss in the period of the change and 
those to come, the value of the restatements for the corresponding periods will 
reflect the values previously deferred through the corridor approach. By using 
the value of restatements related to the accounting of defined benefits we can 
formulate our initial hypothesis:  
 
H1: Entities with incentives to manage earnings used the corridor approach 
 
3.1.2 The discount rate 
IAS 19 specifies that the discount rate must be determined using the market 
yields on the accounting day of high quality corporate bonds (HQC bonds). If 
there is no HQC bond that fairly reflects the underlying financing and when 
there is no working market for such bonds, the IFRS have decided to allow 
government bonds to be used for discounting the projected obligation instead. 
This is frequently the case in recent years, as the amount of HQC bonds 
decreased substantially after the financial crisis. (IFRS, 2013) 
 
The discount factor can vary among entities as a result of the supply of HQC 
bonds, the allowance of government bonds, and the extent of the assumptions 
required. Government bonds may have different maturities, and thus requiring 
their interest rate to be extrapolated to the yield curve for other bonds. And as a 
result of the assumptions related to the discount rate, it can vary among entities 
even though they pursue their business in the same country. This makes the 
discount factor one of few components of the accounting of defined benefit plans 
through which it is still possible to pursue earnings management.  
 
The determination of the discount rate is important as it have a great impact on 
the pension liability. An increase (decrease) in the discount rate decreases 
(increases) the present value of the pension liability and the reported pension 
costs. According to Glaum (2009), the present value of pension liabilities 
increases or decreases by 15 percent as the discount rate changes by one percent.  
 
In several countries, there has been a big debate about which discount rate is 
appropriate to use. The standard requires the discount rate to be equal to the 
risk free rate on high quality corporate bonds, but according to Swinkels (2011) 
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entities deliberately select a higher discount rate than the risk-free, which may 
generate effects such as the present value of the pension liability being reduced. 
This does in turn lead to a surplus in the pension plan. Research also show that 
entities may select the discount rate that best benefit them after comparing 
situations when changing the discount rate. (Obinata, 2002) 
  
To manage the information given to the stakeholders, entities may also use the 
discount rate as a tool for manipulating the numbers. Entities choose to do this 
mainly to hide their financial problems from its stakeholders, especially 
investors. This in order to prevent stakeholders from believing that the 
deterioration of the entity’s financial position is likely when a reduced funding 
occurs. (Bodie, Light, Morock & Taggart, 1987) 
       
Researchers claim that entities choose a discount rate that’s too high in order to 
reduce pension costs and pension liabilities. In a sample of 214 companies, 
Godwin (1999) examined the actuarial assumptions that were made by the 
entities between year 1987 and 1996, and came to the conclusion that entities 
with deficits in the pension plan selected a discount rate that was above average 
for the sample, while the discount rate for companies with surpluses was below 
average. He established that the discount rate for entities with deficits was 
higher than entities with surpluses in nine of the ten years. Thus, the entities 
used the discount rate as a tool to influence the pension plan.  
 
The expected rate of return on plan assets was one of the components in the 
accounting of defined benefit plans under previous standards, and by being 
reported in profit or loss (in contrast to the actual rate of return on plan assets, 
being reported in OCI and thus only described specifically in disclosures) the 
assumptions had a direct impact on the entity’s comprehensive income. The 
different presentations of the two created, as mentioned earlier, a possibility to 
manipulate the result. However, as of IAS 19 (2011), the expected rate of return 
is equal to the discount rate. An expected rate of return that exceeded the 
discount rate can indicate an over-optimistic view on the return on plan assets, 
and thus earnings management. It has been found that entities used the 
expected rate of return more frequently to affect for example earnings per share 
when they were under pressure to achieve performance goals, which resulted in 
aggressive assumptions (Asthana, 2007). 
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Based on this and the premise that users of the financial reports do not make 
use of disclosed information as effectively as the one recognized in the financial 
statements (Davis-Friday et al., 1999), we formulate our three hypotheses 
constituting the second part of this thesis: 
H2: Entities with incentives to manage earnings report a greater difference 
between the expected rate of return on plan assets and the discount rate 
year 2012 
H3: Entities with incentives to manage earnings set a higher discount rate 
after the amendment of IAS 19 
H4: Entities with incentives to manage earnings report a change in 
expected rate of return between 2012 and 20131 
 
3.2 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES 
In this section the following three paragraphs present earnings management 
incentives that we hypothesize will explain our dependent variables in section 
3.1. 
 
3.2.1 Pension plan surpluses and deficits 
If the defined benefit plans exceed (fall below) the projected pension liability the 
pension plan is known to be overfunded (underfunded) that generates an interest 
revenue (interest expense). An underfunding can occur because of a decline in 
the fair value of the plan asset, through a decreased discount rate, or through an 
increase in the value of the liability. When there is an underfunding in the 
pensions plan this denotes a liability that affects earnings and cash flows 
negatively, both in accounting- and in economic terms. This may happen 
immediately after, as well as several years after the deficit arose. The deficit can 
also be seen in the statement of financial position. (Franzoni & Marin, 2006) 
 
Surpluses/deficits in pension plans have an impact on the choice of actuarial 
assumptions. Entities with surpluses in the pension plan have a propensity to 
make actuarial assumptions that decrease the surplus, and this by increasing 
pension liabilities. Entities do this in order to avoid undesirable costs.  
Otherwise managers will have to grant additional benefits to their employees, 
and since the shareholders bear the risk of overfunding, concern among them 
may also arise. Entities with deficits in the pension plan have, on the other 
hand, a propensity to make actuarial assumptions that reduces the deficit by 
decreasing the pension liability. Employees also have reason to become anxious, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Expected return on plan assets 2013 = Discount rate 2013 
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as the entity might consider dismissing them in order to decrease the liability 
and thus the deficit in the pension plan. Asthana (1999) In accordance to the fact 
that a deficit (underfunding) in the projected pension liability affects earnings 
and cash flows, we predict that entities’ deficit in the pensions plan affect the 
extent to which they use earnings management. 
 
3.2.2 Leverage 
Highly leveraged entities tend to desire positive and stable results in order to 
compensate the high risk that follows this kind of financing. Numerous 
researchers have found that the higher leverage ratio, the higher likeliness of 
the use of earnings management in order to increase reported earnings. This as 
creditors are more likely to reject highly leveraged entities’ credit inquiry. 
(Glaum, Lichtblau & Lindemann, 2004) This is often carried out through income-
increasing accruals and other income-increasing accounting choices. Although, 
contradictory to this is the findings that leverage increases reduce the possibility 
of earnings management as this often is associated with an increased monitoring 
by the entity’s creditors, and that higher leverage require higher amortizations - 
leaving less free cash flow for managers to use for manipulation. Consequently, 
previous findings show that leverage levels and changes in such have differing 
impacts on entities’ use of earnings management. (Jelinek, 2007)  
The use of earnings management as a measure to increase revenues is also more 
frequent for entities that seek external financing at a low cost. Leverage ratios 
have been found to be positively related to the demand for external financing, 
but is also considered a noisy measure as some entities requires more 
investments than others because of their characteristics. Because of this, the 
optimal debt-to-equity ratios differ among entities, despite being in the same 
industry. (Jelinek, 2007) 
 
According to Obinata (2000) there is no correlation between the discount rate 
and high leverage. However, as the sample of his study was limited down to 24 
entities it is of great interest to investigate whether there is a correlation 
between the discount rate and leverage based on a larger and international 
sample. This also because previous research suggests that there is a correlation 
between leverage and earnings management. For example Amir and Gordon 
(1996), establishing that highly leverage entities tend to be more aggressive in 
their assumptions. However, there is also research that supports Obinata’s 
conclusion. Park and Shin (2003) assumes that highly leveraged entites are less 
likely to use earnings management as they are under tight supervision by their 
lenders.  
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Previous research has found that the main reasons for earnings manipulation 
are to encourage investors to buy stock, and increase stock value for present 
shareholders. It has also been found that earnings management is more common 
when entities are about to break their debt covenants. As the latter is more 
probable when the debt-to-equity ratio increases, and because of the fact that the 
cost of capital increase for external financing if the entity is highly levered and 
report low revenues (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1996), we find this an important 
factor to include in our hypotheses. 
 
3.2.3 Profitability 
Research show that entities manage earnings in order to exceed three types of 
thresholds: the reporting of a positive result, to sustain (or exceed) previous 
periods’ performance, and to meet analysts’ expectations. The former have 
proved to be the predominant of the three. To meet the entity’s set benchmarks 
have also proved to influence earnings management, both from managers’ 
perspective as well as from the perspective of the entity as a whole. Managers 
can have personal gains connected to the reporting of a positive result or an 
increased result relative to previous periods through bonus systems, and in order 
to preserve the entity’s stock-value analysts’ earnings projections have to be met. 
This as investors base their decisions on information provided by analysts, and 
financial reports published by the entity itself. Banks can also choose to refuse 
giving credit to entities that do not report positive earnings. When earnings are 
close to an unacceptable level, the incentives to manipulate earnings upward are 
significant. Although when the period’s benchmarks have already been met and 
bonuses are near their maximum level, the incentives shift to manipulations 
downward and the deferring of earnings, as this makes future benchmarks and 
thresholds easier to meet. (Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser, 1999) 
 
In addition to the previously stated facts, research have found that entities are 
more likely to report changes specifically in net pension costs that increase its 
net income when they otherwise will fail their set goals - especially those that 
usually pass or fail their goals by small margins. Entities that would reach their 
goals regardless are on the other hand more likely to report changes in net 
pension costs that decrease its net income. This agrees with the theory that 
managers do smoothen the net income in order to be able to report an increased 
result in later periods. (Blankley, Comprix & Hong, 2013) 
 
As mentioned earlier, entities tend to use earnings management to increase its 
reported earnings when it otherwise will have to report a loss - especially if the 
margins are small. And as Obinata (2002) found, there is a correlation between 
the discount factors and profitability, where entities have a tendency to increase 
the discount rate the less profitable they are. In accordance with above-
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mentioned facts, we hypothesize that less profitable entities tend to manage 
earnings through pension accounting.  
 
As the incentives for deferring actuarial losses and thus reporting a higher 
profit/smaller loss are many, and previous research have shown that earnings 
management through aggressive assumptions is especially frequent for entities 
having to report a loss or a decreased result and entities expecting a decreased 
result (Bergstresser, Desai & Rauh, 2006), we will focus our hypotheses in the 
first section on entities using the corridor approach and thus focusing on 
earnings management before the amendment, and the hypotheses in the second 
section on differences in discount rate and the expected rate of return before and 
after the amendment. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this thesis we use two different samples, with a primary sample (part two) 
that include 3807 entities from all over the world with defined benefit plans, 
establishing their financial reports according to IFRS and listed on markets 
regulated by ESMA. A subsample derived from the primary sample is used for 
part one, limited down to the 244 Nordic entities. This as it includes data that 
requires manual collection of information from financial reports.2 The primary 
sample is the same that our supervisor uses in her recent paper3 containing data 
from year 2012 and 2013, and the subsample from year 2012. Our sample data 
have been retrieved through the database Datastream. We found Datastream 
appropriate as a sufficient amount of data was available for all of our sought 
variables in the database.  
In order to meet the purpose of this thesis, the most appropriate method is a 
quantitative study, because of the large amount of data that is to be processed. A 
quantitative analysis will allow us to draw conclusions based on its output, but 
with consideration to the fact that statistics cannot process all conditions 
relating to the subject. Furthermore, the data can contain errors of 
measurements, and the regression models can be specified erroneously. This can 
consequently lead up to faulty inferences. A qualitative study would not be 
applicable in order to research our sought correlations. We will perform a 
multiple regression on our data using the ordinary least squares method, OLS, 
after a winsorization at 5 %. This as we find OLS an appropriate method to use 
for our data. A winzorisation will allow us to include all values when at the same 
time our output will not be distorted by outliers, as they are not weighted as 
heavily. Each model will be tested with three levels of significance; p<0.10, 
p<0.05 and p<0.01.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The data on restatements have been collected by Emmeli Runesson	  3	  From Disclosure to Recognition: The Case of ”Corridor” Accounting Under IAS 19 Employee Benefits	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REGRESSION MODEL COMPONENTS 
 
 
Variable Definition 
ActGL Restatements arising from the amendment of IAS 19, reflecting 
the value of actuarial gains and losses previously deferred 
through the corridor approach. 
DR, Discount 
rate 
The rate at which the PBO is discounted. The discount rate is 
determined by reference to a High Quality Corporate Bond 
(HQC bonds) - mainly bonds that is rated as “AAA” or “AA” by a 
recognized rating agency, and the estimated time until the 
deficit is to be paid. The higher discount rate the smaller 
recognized liability, and thus higher risk. 
ERR, Expected 
rate of return 
Expected rate of return on plan assets (IAS 19, 1998).  
NPL(A), Net 
pension liability 
(asset) 
A net pension liability equals a deficit (surplus) in the pension 
plan; the liability exceeds (fall below) the plan assets. Deficit = 
1, Surplus = 0 (Dummy variable). 
LEV, Leverage Long term debt / (Long term debt + Market value + Preferred 
stock) 
PROFIT, 
Profitability 
Less profitable* = 1, Profitable = 0 (Dummy variable) 
*Defined in this thesis as entities 
with a net income below sample 
average. 
TA, Total assets Total assets at beginning of period. 
PBO, Pension 
data projected 
benefit 
obligation 
 
Industry 
 
 
 
Country 
Fair value of the projected benefit obligation on the balance 
sheet date (estimation based on actuarial assumptions). 
 
 
 
Industries divided into six different sectors: industrial, utility, 
transportation, bank/savings and loan, insurance and other 
financial. (Dummy variables) 
 
The origin of the entity divided into four countries in part one, 
and 43 countries	  in part two. (Dummy variables) 
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In our models we use control variables to reduce the likelihood of spurious 
correlation which occurs when there is a high coefficient of determination 
between two variables but are in fact influenced by a third variable. In this 
thesis we control for country, industry, the projected benefit obligation, PBO, and 
total assets (in order to determine the size of the entities). According to Baker et 
al. (2003), previous research has shown that an entity’s size has an impact on the 
degree of the use of earnings management. The bigger the entity, the more likely 
it is that the entity delays its earnings. By controlling for the projected benefit 
obligations, we rule out differences arising from the size of the actual liability. 
Entities with a small PBO may not need to use earnings management, as this 
affects the entities’ financials to a small extent nevertheless. 
In order to test our hypotheses, six regression models have been formulated. 
Three different independent variables related to earnings management are 
recurring in each hypothesis, referred to as earnings management incentives. 
Those are leverage, net pension liability/(asset) and profitability. The last two 
are dummy variables in order to separate net pension liabilities (deficits in the 
pension plan) from net pension assets, and to be able to define entities as less 
profitable. Our controls are recurring in all hypotheses and models, and consist 
of total assets, projected benefit obligation, industry and country. In models 4-6 
of the hypotheses three different interactions4 are tested, including different 
combinations of the earnings management incentives. 
In hypothesis one the dependent variable is the balance carried forward of 
restatements in 2011 (and thus balance brought forward in 2012), reflecting the 
values of actuarial gains and losses previously being deferred through the 
corridor approach. 
 
ActGLi = β0 + β1NPL(A) + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi              (1) 
ActGLi = β0 + β1LEV + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi           (2) 
ActGLi = β0 + β1PROFIT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi            (3) 
ActGLi = β0 + β1NPL(A) + β2LEV + γ1EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi           (4) 
ActGLi = β0 + β1LEV + β2PROFIT + γ2EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi          (5) 
ActGLi = β0 + β1PROFIT + β2NPL(A) + γ3EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi      (6) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 EM-INT1 = LEV × NPL(A) 
  EM-INT2 = LEV × PROFIT 
  EM-INT3 = PROFIT × NPL(A)   
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Hypothesis two is formulated with the difference between the expected return on 
plan assets and the discount rate (both from year 2012 and in percent) as the 
dependent variable.  
 
ERR-DRi = β 0 + β 1NPL(A) + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi            (1) 
ERR-DRi = β0 + β1LEV + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi             (2) 
ERR-DRi = β0 + β1PROFIT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi            (3) 
ERR-DRi = β0 + β1NPL(A) + β2LEV + γ1EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi           (4) 
ERR-DRi = β0 + β1LEV + β2PROFIT + γ2EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi          (5) 
ERR-DRi = β0 + β1PROFIT + β2NPL(A) + γ3EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi  (6) 
Hypothesis three process the change in the discount rate between the years 2012 
and 2013 as the dependent variable, and thus relating to the effects of the 
amendment of IAS 19 regarding earnings management. This is the first 
hypothesis relating to earnings management after the amendment of IAS 19. 
 
ΔDRi= β0+β1NPL(A) + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi                          (1) 
ΔDRi= β0+β1LEV + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi                                                    (2) 
ΔDRi= β0+β1PROFIT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi                        (3) 
ΔDRi= β0+β1NPL(A) + β2 LEV+γ1EM-INT+ 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi             (4) 
ΔDRi= β0+β1LEV + β2PROFIT+ γ2EM-INT+ 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi                   (5) 
ΔDRi= β0+β1PROFIT + β2NPL(A) + γ3EM-INT+ 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi                  (6) 
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To test our last hypothesis we applied the difference between the expected return 
on plan assets between year 2012 and 2013 as the dependent variable. As this 
has to be equal to the discount rate in 2013, the discount rate is used to reflect 
its value in 2013. 
ΔERRi = β0 + β1NPL(A) + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi        (1) 
ΔERRi = β0 + β1LEV + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi                                                             (2) 
ΔERRi = β0 + β1PROFIT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi                                                             (3) 
ΔERRi = β0 + β1NPL(A) + β2LEV + γ1EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi             (4) 
ΔERRi = β0 + β1LEV + β2PROFIT + γ2EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi      (5) 
ΔERRi = β0 + β1PROFIT + β2NPL(A) + γ3EM-INT + 𝜑!!!!!! iControlsi + εi   (6) 
 
As the descriptive statistics on the following page show, in part 1 (H1) the 
amount of present values vary from 89 to 244 - of which the net pension 
liability/(asset) is the variable containing the most missing values, consequently 
affecting the interactions EMint1 and EMint3 as well. Part 2 (H2, H3, H4) also 
have missing values, but the amount of present values still exceeds at least 600 
(the majority of the variables include 1000+ values). Missing values are more 
frequent in variables that relates to the accounting for defined benefit plans. 
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EXHIBIT 1
Descriptive statistics (pt. 1)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max Present values Missing values Total
ActGL -237,6412 1082,967 -11939 550,2 243 5 248
NPLA 0,2022472 0,4039514 0 1 89 159 248
LEV 0,3081369 0,2575966 0 0,9153702 243 5 248
PROFIT 0,8237705 0,3817985 0 1 244 4 248
EMint1 0,0812126 0,2129464 0 0,9148991 88 160 248
EMint2 0,2545324 0,2673296 0 0,9153702 242 6 248
EMint3 0,1348315 0,3434786 0 1 89 159 248
EXHIBIT 2
Descriptive statistics (pt. 2)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max Present values Missing values Total
ERRDR 1,190672 4,508296 -25,55 52,5 1072 2737 3809
deltaDR 0,662151 3,749621 -16,14 62,5 795 3014 3809
deltaERR -0,4823754 5,57445 -31,9 63,3 602 3207 3809
NPLA 0,102834 0,303865 0 1 1235 2574 3809
LEV 19631,41 393449,3 0 1,91E+07 3619 190 3809
PROFIT 0,9315214 0,252599 0 1 3753 56 3809
EMint1 8543,364 199326,6 0 5919001 1211 2598 3809
EMint2 16897,82 365748,6 0 1,91E+07 3566 243 3809
EMint3 0,0842105 0,2778158 0 1 1235 2574 3809
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5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 THE CORRIDOR APPROACH 
In exhibit three we find the regression output for the models relating to the use 
of the corridor approach, with the variable ‘ActGL’ as the dependent. The 
variable PROFIT is significant at a 1 % and 5 % level (coefficient = 217.3, t-value 
= 3.75 (model 3) and coefficient = 203.1, t-value = 2.57 (model 5)), indicating that 
less profitable entities reported a higher value of restatements as a result of the 
amendment of IAS 19, and thus deferred a higher value of actuarial gains and 
losses through the corridor approach. We also see that NPL(A) is significant at 5 
% (coefficient = -297.9, t-value = -2.21 (model 4) and coefficient = -279.6, t-value = 
-2.09 (model 6)), where the negative correlation state that entities with a deficit 
in the pension plan have had to make restatements of a lesser value, and 
consequently deferred actuarial gains and losses of a lesser value during 
previous periods. The distinction that those solely are actuarial losses cannot be 
made though, as this is not specified in the regression. When adding the 
interaction EMint1 (LEV × NPLA) (i.e. a deficit and a high debt-to-equity ratio), 
we can deduce that this variable is also significant at a 5 % level (coefficient = 
697.9, t-value = 2.42), suggesting that highly leveraged entities with a deficit in 
their pension plan used the corridor approach to defer actuarial gains and losses 
of a higher value. The interaction EMint3 (PROF × NPLA) is also significant at a 
level of 5 % (coefficient = 363.6, t-value = 2.26), which indicates that less 
profitable entities with a deficit in their pension plan report a higher value of 
restatements, and thus deferred a higher value of actuarial gains and losses via 
the corridor method. In addition to these are significant control variables such as 
PBO and several countries. 
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EXHIBIT 3
Regression output
Dependent var. ActGL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent var.
NPLA -25.61 -297.9** -279.6** 
(-0.35) (-2.21) (-2.09)   
LEV 72.63 -14.43 8.838
(0.92) (-0.10) (0.05)
PROFIT 217.3*** 203.1** 34.99
(3.75) (2.57) (0.33)
EMint1 697.9**
(2.42)
EMint2 41.02
(0.21)
EMint3 363.6** 
(2.26)
Constant -138.7 -156 -334.3*** -118.8 -329.3** -157.9
(-1.00) (-1.29) (-2.64) (-0.85) (-2.40) (-0.98)   
N 89 201 202 88 201 89
R-sq 0.441 0.346 0.389 0.485 0.39 0.483
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
Control variables: TA, PBO, Industry, Country
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5.2 THE DISCOUNT RATE 
When performing our analysis, an average of 17 control variables reflecting the 
entities’ origin were omitted because of collinearity. As there were a total of 43 
control variables of this kind (and several others reflecting entity size, PBO and 
industry), we don’t find that this impaired our result. 
 
The regression output for hypothesis two is shown in exhibit four, where we can 
see that the variable LEV is significant at a level of 10 % (coefficient = 0.799, t-
value = 1.66). This indicates that highly leveraged entities in our sample 
reported a greater difference between ERR and DR year 2012. This can indicate 
an expected rate of return set higher than the discount rate, all other equal, 
being consistent with previously stated earnings management theories. No other 
earnings management variables were significant in the regression, which leads 
us to the interpretation that the entities were not affected by these factors when 
making actuarial assumptions regarding the expected return and the discount 
rate during the year. Our control variable PBO was also significant in all models, 
with a negative correlation with ERRDR stating that entities with a greater 
projected benefit obligation reported a smaller difference between the two. 
 
In the regression output for hypothesis three (exhibit five) we find a negative 
correlation of the variable NPLA in model six at a 10 % significance level 
(coefficient = -0.789, t-value = -1.77). Thus, entities with deficits in their pension 
plan report a smaller change in the discount rate between the years. In addition 
to this are significant control variables such as PBO, TA and the country 
Hungary. The latter can indicate that entities originating from Hungary change 
their discount rate more than those in other countries, but the explanation to 
this can be found in circumstances other than solely earnings management.  
 
The regression output for our last hypothesis (hypothesis four) is shown in 
exhibit six, where the variable PROFIT is significant at a level of 10 % in models 
three (coefficient = 0.640, t-value = 1.83) and five (coefficient = 0.761, t-value = 
1.77). This suggests that less profitable entities reported a greater change in the 
expected rate of return between year 2012 and 2013, which can indicate that 
these entities chose a higher expected rate of return in 2013 (i.e. chose a discount 
rate year 2013 higher than the expected rate of return year 2012). This in order 
to reduce the pension liability. No other earnings management variables were 
significant in the regression. Of the control variables the significant ones were 
TA, the insurance industry, and a number of countries. 
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EXHIBIT 4
Regression output
Dependent var. ERRDR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent var.
NPLA -0.295 -0.292 -0.526
(-1.51) (-0.96) (-1.17)
LEV 0.198 -0.0488 0.799*
(0.92) (-0.19) (1.66)
PROFIT -0.231 -0.00491 -0.168
(-1.01) (-0.02) (-0.63)
EMint1 0.0983
(-0.04)
EMint2 -0.72
(-1.38)
EMint3 0.289
(0.58)
Constant 1.516 1.283 1.664 1.511 1.359 1.682
(0.83) (0.69) (0.89) (0.83) (0.73) (0.91)
N 787 1043 1052 779 1043 787
R-sq 0.059 0.105 0.104 0.06 0.108 0.06
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
Control variables: TA, PBO, Industry, Country
EXHIBIT 5
Regression output
Dependent var. deltaDR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent var.
NPLA -0.281 -0.241 -0.789*
(-1.34) (-0.72) (-1.77)
LEV 0.0948 0.144 0.645
(0.43) (0.57) (1.4)
PROFIT 0.111 0.324 -0.111
(0.51) (1.19) (-0.44)
EMint1 -1.332
(-0.46)
EMint2 -0.694
(-1.37)
EMint3 0.653
(1.3)
Constant 1.075 0.971 -0.564 -0.676 -1.235 1.192
(0.65) (0.6) (-0.35) (-0.42) (-0.74) (0.71)
N 621 743 754 612 743 621
R-sq 0.108 0.103 0.098 0.118 0.105 0.111
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
Control variables: TA, PBO, Industry, Country
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EXHIBIT 6
Regression output
Dependent var. deltaERR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent var.
NPLA 0.0576 0.276 -0.285
(0.18) (0.55) (-0.44)   
LEV -0.0744 0.158 0.271
(-0.20) (0.38) (0.38)
PROFIT 0.640* 0.761* 0.299
(1.83) (1.77) (0.75)
EMint1 -3.732
(-0.85)
EMint2 -0.471
(-0.58)
EMint3 0.425
(0.57)
Constant 4.848** -1.795 -2.108 4.796** -3.527 4.577*  
(2) (-0.75) (-0.88) (1.98) (-1.44) (1.87)
N 493 587 594 487 587 493
R-sq 0.086 0.102 0.1 0.098 0.107 0.088
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01
Control variables: TA, PBO, Industry, Country
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6. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
 
This thesis is built on the presumption that entities used the previous version of 
IAS 19 in order to manipulate earnings, and that this still occurs. The output 
from our regression models support these premises to a certain extent; under the 
previous standard indications of the use of earnings management have been 
found, but after the amendment the use seem to have decreased. This can 
indicate that the amendment reduced the opportunities for the use of earnings 
management within the accounting for defined benefit plans under IFRS.  
 
Our findings in part one show that Nordic entities with deficits in their pension 
plan combined with a high debt-to-equity ratio as well as less profitable ones 
report a higher value of restatements as a result of the amendment, and thus 
deferred a higher value of actuarial gains and losses through the corridor 
approach during previous periods. These results support our hypothesis that 
entities with incentives to manage earnings used the corridor approach. This 
result also supports previous research conducted by for example Bergstresser et 
al. (2006), concluding that entities that report a loss or a decrease in the results 
tend to manage earnings. We also found that entities in our sample with a deficit 
in their pension plan reported a lesser value of restatements and consequently 
deferred a lesser value of actuarial gains and losses through the corridor 
approach, indicating that those deferred actuarial results possibly worsening 
their result - although we cannot state that those are specifically actuarial 
losses. This in accordance to Asthana (1999), finding that entities with a deficit 
in the pension plan are more inclined to use earnings management. When an 
interaction representing less profitable entities with deficits in their pension 
plan included in the regression also indicate the use of earnings management, as 
it shows that the value of deferred actuarial gains and losses tend to be higher 
for such entities.  
 
In part two, based on our larger worldwide sample, we found that highly 
leveraged entities reported a greater difference between the expected return on 
plan assets and the discount rate in 2012. This can indicate that they, all else 
equal, chose a higher expected rate of return than the discount rate in order to 
increase the reported earnings in the comprehensive income, or chose a smaller 
discount rate – supporting our hypothesis that entities with incentives to 
manage earnings report a greater difference between the expected rate of return 
on plan assets and the discount rate year 2012. The former assumption is in line 
with the findings of Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996), stating that highly 
leveraged entities are more likely to make aggressive assumptions in order to 
pass debt covenants, and Glaum, Lichtblau & Lindemann (2004), finding that 
highly leveraged entities are more likely to use earnings management.  
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And as a decreased discount rate increase the pension liability we see no 
incentive for highly leveraged entities to manipulate their discount rate 
downwards without being forced to do so. 
 
In the final hypotheses of part two we found that entities with a deficit in their 
pension plan report a lesser difference between the discount rate between 2012 
and 2013, thus not supporting our hypothesis that entities with incentives to 
manage earnings set a higher discount rate after the amendment of IAS 19 – at 
least not concentrating on the discount rate during the years. We can therefore, 
in this hypothesis, not prove that entities of this kind resort to solely the 
discount rate if manipulating results upward or downward in year 2013. Our 
output also show that less profitable entities report a greater change in the 
expected rate of return between year 2012 and 2013, which can indicate that 
they set, all else equal, a higher expected rate of return (i.e. a higher discount 
rate year 2013 than the expected rate of return year 2012). The result supports 
our hypothesis that entities with incentives to manage earnings report a change 
in the expected rate of return between 2012 and 2013. This in line with 
Bergstresser, Desai & Rauh’s (2006) findings concluding that entities having to 
report a negative or/and decreased result are more likely to make aggressive 
assumptions. 	  
Our overall impression of the regression outputs are that IAS 19 have succeeded 
to decrease the use of earnings management when accounting for defined benefit 
plans, as the significance of variables reflecting earnings management incentives 
in the hypotheses processing circumstances after the amendment (hypothesis 
three and four) are low compared to those processing circumstances solely before 
the amendment (hypothesis one and two).  
 
Our suggestions on further research on the subject is an analysis of the standard 
with regard to earnings management, carried out with additional or entirely 
different earnings management incentives such as ownership structure, 
management’s bonus scheme and degree of corporate governance. Preferably 
with focus on different aspects of the discount rate as this still can be used in 
order to manage earnings, and as we didn’t find major indications of this when 
studying it immediately after the amendment. We find it likely that more 
enhanced indications can be found in a few years. 
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